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5. Public Authorities: What is a hybrid public authority 
under the HRA?  
Alexander Williams 
 
An analysis of when the HRA subjects private bodies to the Convention is highly germane to 
any discourse concerning the impact of the HRA on private law. The common law horizontal 
effect mechanism is one route through which to hold private bodies, albeit indirectly, to 
Convention standards.
1
 Another route is through the hybrid public authority scheme – if a 
private body performs ‘functions of a public nature’ under s 6(3)(b), it is regarded during its 
public activity as a public authority and must respect the Convention.
2
 
 
This chapter builds on earlier work which attempts to coax the judges into adopting a wider 
interpretation of s 6(3)(b).
3
 Its central message is that there is no need for the courts to 
construe that provision as restrictively as they have done since the HRA entered into force. 
Whilst ostensibly public in nature, hybrid public authorities are institutionally private bodies. 
The crucial effect of this, coupled with a close analysis of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
is that hybrids enjoy Convention rights themselves under the HRA, even during the 
performance of their public functions. They can therefore assert their own Convention rights 
as a defence to Convention-based challenges by claimants in court – a powerful method of 
self-protection which, once properly appreciated, should help ease judicial reluctance to 
                                                          
1
 See chapters XXX and XXX. 
2
 HRA, ss 6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(5). The third route is through the interpretative obligation under s 3 HRA. For 
discussion see chapter XXX by Jan van Zyl Smit. 
3
 See A. Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act: Private 
Contractors, Rights-Stripping and “Chameleonic” Horizontal Effect’ [2011] PL 139. 
 2 
widen the scope of s 6(3)(b) to encompass a greater range of functions performed by private 
bodies. 
 
In substance, then, the hybrid scheme is one of horizontal effect – what may be termed 
‘public liability’ horizontality.4 Section 6(3)(b) may treat private bodies performing public 
functions as public authorities for the purpose of furnishing claimants with a Convention-
based cause of action to bring them to court, but they must be treated by the court as private 
bodies for the different purpose of allowing them to rely on their own Convention rights. To 
ensure that the Convention rights of hybrid public authorities are fully protected, the hybrid 
scheme should be read, it is suggested, as generating ‘chameleonic’ horizontal effect. Aside 
from guaranteeing hybrids’ Convention rights, the chameleonic model should appeal to the 
courts for the additional reason that it produces a form of horizontal effect not dissimilar in 
scope and effect from that which they have already endorsed in the parallel common law 
context mentioned above. 
 
The chapter begins by introducing the basic problems with the courts’ approach to s 6(3)(b) 
and discusses why hybrids should be regarded as capable of relying on their own Convention 
rights under the HRA. It then considers the importance of the chameleonic model and how 
the model derives additional support from the courts’ case law on common law horizontal 
effect. 
 
A. The hybrid issue 
 
                                                          
4
 See chapter XXX, p. 000. 
 3 
There are two main problems with the courts’ approach to the hybrid scheme. The first is that 
they appear to have taken too narrow an interpretation of the term ‘functions of a public 
nature’ under s 6(3)(b). It is clear from the case law that s 6(3)(b) applies to relatively 
straightforward examples of public activity such as the exercise by a private organisation of 
statutory coercive powers.
5
 The courts have also held, again not controversially, that s 6(3)(b) 
will apply to the actions of a private organisation which is created and assisted by a local 
authority to take over the running of a particular public service.
6
 But beyond these contexts 
claimants have found it notoriously difficult to persuade the courts that a defendant exercises 
public functions. In particular, the courts have held that the delivery of contracted out public 
services by a private organisation acting on behalf of central or local government, of itself, is 
not a public function.
7
 This is of especial concern given that contracting out has now become 
an accepted and widespread method of delivering such services.
8
 In R (Heather) v Leonard 
Cheshire Foundation,
9
 the appellants were placed by their local authority in a private care 
home run by LCF, a charity who delivered the services on the local authority’s behalf. LCF 
later decided to close the home and the appellants claimed that this would amount to a breach 
by LCF of their right to a home life under Art 8. The Court of Appeal held that LCF was not 
performing public functions when delivering the residential care services. Giving the 
judgment of the court, Lord Woolf CJ emphasised that LCF’s functions were private even 
                                                          
5
 R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin), [2002] 1 WLR 2610. 
6
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] 
QB 48; R (Beer) v Hampshire Farmer’s Markets Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1056, [2004] 1 WLR 233. 
7
 The courts have also held that s 6(3)(b) does not apply to the delivery of privatised services: Cameron v 
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 163; James v London Electricity Plc 
[2004] EWHC 3226 (QB). 
8
 For fuller discussion of the rise in outsourcing and its impact on public law, see M. Hunt, ‘Constitutionalism 
and the Contractualisation of Government’ and M. Aronson, ‘A Public Lawyer’s Responses to Privatisation and 
Outsourcing’, both in M. Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997), at 
p. 21 and p. 40 respectively. 
9
 [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] HRLR 30. 
 4 
though the local authority would have been regarded as performing a public function had it 
delivered the services itself.
10
 Leonard Cheshire was affirmed in YL v Birmingham City 
Council,
11
 in which a bare majority of the House of Lords ruled that a private company in the 
same position as LCF in Leonard Cheshire was not a hybrid public authority. The resulting 
incongruity and arbitrariness is concerning. Vulnerable service users can plead their 
Convention rights against the service provider if the local authority decides to deliver the 
services in-house,
12
 but not if it decides – which is completely beyond the service user’s 
control – to contract them out.13 
 
Parliament has since intervened to reverse the YL and Leonard Cheshire result. Under s 145 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA), the delivery of residential care services in 
these circumstances will amount to a public function under s 6(3)(b) HRA. But the reasoning 
underlying the decisions has been left untouched and remains equally applicable to other 
contexts in which contracting out may arise. The reasoning in YL and Leonard Cheshire is 
unpalatable because it seems illogical on its face. It is difficult to see how the mere fact of 
contracting out a function can change its nature from public to private.
14
 If a function is 
regarded as public when delivered by a local authority in-house, it should equally be regarded 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., at [15]. It should be stressed that the nature of the function is irrelevant to the local authority’s 
Convention liability because the local authority is a core public authority and therefore bound to respect the 
Convention in everything it does (see below, p. 000). 
11
 [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95. 
12
 This is because local authorities are core public authorities: see below, p. 000. 
13
 For criticism of the courts’ approach to s 6(3)(b), see especially P. Craig, ‘Contracting out, the Human Rights 
Act and the scope of judicial review’ (2002) 118 LQR 551; C. Donnelly, ‘Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: 
private contractors, contract and s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act’ [2005] PL 785; S. Palmer, ‘Public 
functions and private services: a gap in human rights protection’ (2008) 6 IJCL 585; A. Williams, ‘YL v 
Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and “functions of a public nature”’ [2008] EHRLR 524; Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act 
(2003-04 HL 39), (2003-04 HC 382); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Ninth Report, The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act (2006-07 HL 77), (2006-07 HC 410). Cf D. Oliver, ‘Functions of a 
public nature under the Human Rights Act’ [2004] PL 329. 
14
 Craig ‘Contracting out’, 556. 
 5 
as public under the HRA when contracted out to be performed by a private organisation on 
the local authority’s behalf.15 
 
The majority of the House of Lords in YL made a number of attempts to explain this 
argument away, but none were particularly convincing.
16
 In particular, their Lordships 
believed that the performance of functions for commercial gain ‘point[ed] against’ those 
functions being public.
17
 They seemed to believe the dividing line between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ under s 6(3)(b), in other words, to mirror the classically liberal distinction between 
the public-facing state and the self-interested private individual; between bodies created and 
controlled by law and politics to serve the public interest, on the one hand, and bodies who 
are entitled to act for their own (lawful) ends, on the other.
18
 Though such a divide does 
appear to run through Strasbourg’s jurisprudence on the distinction between governmental 
and non-governmental organisations under the Convention,
19
 it is clear that s 6(3)(b) intends 
the public-private divide to be drawn in a different place. Excluding commercially-motivated 
activity from s 6(3)(b) tends to empty it of any real purpose as a provision intended to apply 
to private bodies – bodies who, by their very nature in liberal societies, are entitled to act for 
their own motivations rather than being bound to serve the public interest.
20
 Excluding 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
16
 For fuller discussion see Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities’, 144-145. 
17
 YL, n 11 above, at [116] (Lord Mance). Lords Scott and Neuberger agreed. 
18
 See further R v Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings [1995] 1 All ER 513 (QB), p. 524 (Laws J); R 
(Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2001] EWHC 429 (Admin) at [72] (Stanley Burnton J). 
19
 See below, pp.000-000. It also seems to reflect the distinction between core public authorities and private 
persons under the HRA: D. Oliver, ‘The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the 
Human Rights Act’ [2000] PL 476, pp.481-483. See further Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley 
Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546 at [14] (Lord Nicholls), [62] (Lord 
Hope), [86] (Lord Hobhouse) and [156] (Lord Rodger). 
20
 Palmer, ‘Public functions and private services’, 601. 
 6 
commercially motivated activity would even seem, as one commentator has observed,
21
 to 
conflict with the uncontroversial ruling of Keith J in R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd
22
 by 
excluding the exercise of statutory powers of detention by a private psychiatric hospital from 
s 6(3)(b). The YL reasoning is highly questionable from a doctrinal perspective and the 
meaning of the term ‘functions of a public nature’ should therefore still be a live issue for the 
Supreme Court. 
 
The second problem with the courts’ approach to the hybrid scheme is the confusion 
surrounding the Convention rights of hybrid public authorities themselves. The issue has 
never been comprehensively addressed in court,
23
 and Buxton LJ once curtly stated that when 
discharging its public functions a hybrid ‘has no such rights’.24 The view that hybrid public 
authorities are somehow ‘stripped’ of the ability to rely on the Convention in their public 
capacities is also held, again with little or no supporting analysis, by a surprising number of 
academic writers.
25
 
 
Issues one and two – the width of s 6(3)(b) and the ability of hybrids to rely on the 
Convention themselves – are bound to be linked.26 The more disruptive the impact on private 
individuals of being subjected to the Convention, the narrower one would expect Parliament 
                                                          
21
 J. Landau, ‘Functional public authorities after YL’ [2007] PL 630, p. 636. 
22
 Partnerships in Care, n 5 above. 
23
 Baroness Hale left the issue ‘for another day’ in her dissent in YL, n 11 above, at [74]. Lord Nicholls stated 
simply that hybrid public authorities should be able to rely on their own Convention rights ‘when necessary’ in 
Aston Cantlow, n 19 above, at [11]. 
24
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 26, [2008] QB 1 at [75]. 
25
 See e.g. Oliver, ‘The frontiers of the State’, 492; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the 
Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford, 2006), p. 122; H. Quane, ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of 
“public authority” under the Human Rights Act’ [2006] PL 106, p. 109. Cf H. Davis, ‘Public Authorities as 
“Victims” under the Human Rights Act’ [2005] CLJ 315, p. 321. For a fuller discussion see Williams, ‘A Fresh 
Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities’, 145-154. 
26
 On the link between a public authority's ability to rely on the Convention and the width of the term ‘public 
authority’ under s 6, see Oliver, ‘The frontiers of the State’, 490-492. 
 7 
to have intended s 6(3)(b) to apply. This is an important consideration because the term 
‘functions of a public nature’ is so vague that judges are likely to fall back onto policy and 
fairness considerations when determining its meaning.
27
 If the rights-stripping idea can be 
convincingly debunked,
28
 judges should be less reluctant to extend their interpretation of the 
public functions term in future. 
 
Debunking rights-stripping  
Aside from courts and hybrid public authorities, which are listed as public authorities by ss 
6(3)(a) and (b) respectively, the HRA is commonly acknowledged to give rise to a third 
species of ‘core’ public authority. The existence of these ‘obviously’ public bodies is implied 
by the non-exhaustive wording of s 6(3), which states that public authority ‘includes’ the 
public authorities set out in its list. Unlike hybrids, core public authorities must comply with 
the Convention in everything they do, whether public or private activity. This is because s 
6(5) alleviates only hybrids – and not core public authorities – from the duty to act 
Convention-compatibly during private activity. 
 
It is clear that core public authorities lack Convention rights under the HRA because the 
HRA affords Convention protection only to ‘victims’,29 i.e. bodies who qualify as ‘non-
                                                          
27
 In YL, n 11 above, Lord Neuberger stated, at [128], that the words ‘are so imprecise in their meaning that one 
searches for a policy as an aid to interpretation.’ Along similar lines, see M. Elliott, ‘“Public” and “private”: 
defining the scope of the Human Rights Act’[2007] CLJ 485, p. 487. 
28
 In YL (ibid.), at [116], Lord Mance stated that SCH, if it were a hybrid public authority, could have relied on 
its ‘ordinary private law freedom to carry on operations under agreed contractual terms’ under Art 8(2) as a 
defence, presumably under the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ qualification. His Lordship did not refer 
specifically to SCH’s Convention rights, however, and his view that the ‘rights of others’ extends to a general 
right to contractual autonomy sits uncomfortably with Strasbourg case law to the effect that Convention 
qualifications are exhaustive and should be narrowly construed: see Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214 at 
[42]; Golder v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524 at [44]. 
29
 HRA, s 7(1). 
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governmental organisations’ under Art 34.30 The effect of Art 34 is to distinguish between 
non-governmental organisations, who can file Convention claims in Strasbourg, and 
governmental organisations, who cannot. It is difficult to see how core public authorities, 
inherently part of the fabric of government, could ever claim to be non-governmental 
organisations under Art 34.
31
 It is equally clear that hybrids, by contrast, do enjoy 
Convention rights, at least when they engage in only private activity. This is because hybrids 
are private bodies. Section 6(5) emphasises their institutionally private nature by treating 
them as ordinary private individuals when they act in their private capacities. As private 
bodies, hybrids will straightforwardly fall within the definition of a non-governmental 
organisation under Art 34 when engaging in only private activity. 
 
Although the HRA treats hybrids as public authorities for the purpose of generating a 
Convention-based statutory cause of action against them, it does not follow that the HRA 
intends to treat them as public authorities for all other purposes, too. Whether or not hybrid 
public authorities are stripped of their Convention rights when performing public functions 
depends on Strasbourg’s definition of a governmental organisation. Hybrids can only be said 
to lose Convention protection when performing public functions if Strasbourg would regard 
them as governmental organisations when performing public functions. It is important not to 
misinterpret the Strasbourg case law. Domestic courts risk misclassifying hybrids and 
wrongly denying them Convention protection if they reach the conclusion that Strasbourg 
would regard them as governmental organisations too readily. There is an important burden 
of proof issue here – those who believe that hybrids are rights-stripped must demonstrate 
                                                          
30
 HRA, s 7(7). 
31
 Aston Cantlow, n 19 above, at [8] (Lord Nicholls). 
 9 
convincingly that Strasbourg would regard private bodies as governmental organisations 
when performing public functions. 
 
A number of judges and academic writers do seem to believe that hybrids become 
governmental organisations when performing public functions.
 32
 But this is only a tacit 
assumption that emerges from their view that the governmental organisation jurisprudence 
can assist domestic courts in identifying a public function under s 6(3)(b) (that jurisprudence 
must therefore extend to private bodies performing public functions in their eyes). The 
flimsiness of this assumption is exposed by a more detailed analysis of the Strasbourg case 
law with the specific task of determining the rights-status of hybrids in mind. 
 
Aside from the definition of a governmental organisation under Art 34, there is another 
branch of Strasbourg jurisprudence relevant to this task. This jurisprudence relates to the 
issue of state responsibility. If a body acts in such a way as to affect the enjoyment by a 
victim of their Convention rights, that body is either an emanation of the state or it is not. If it 
is an emanation of the state such as a government minister,
33
 the state will be directly 
responsible for its behaviour in Strasbourg. If the body is a private body rather than an 
emanation of the state, the state will only be responsible for the body’s behaviour indirectly, 
i.e. if the Convention places the state under a positive obligation to regulate the body’s 
behaviour in the circumstances in question. Strasbourg has made it clear that the distinction 
between emanations of the state and private bodies in this context is identical to the 
                                                          
32
 See Quane, ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence’; R (West) v Lloyd's of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506, [2004] 
HRLR 27 at [36]-[39] (Brooke LJ); YL, n 11 above, at [161] (Lord Neuberger); R (Weaver) v London & 
Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2009] HRLR 29 at [35] (Elias LJ) and [117]-[118] (Rix LJ) 
(dissenting). 
33
 See Golder v United Kingdom, n 28 above. 
 10 
distinction between governmental and non-governmental organisations under Art 34.
34
 As a 
result, the state responsibility jurisprudence also helps identify the meaning of a 
governmental organisation in Strasbourg. I have conducted an extensive analysis of both 
branches of Strasbourg jurisprudence elsewhere and do not intend to repeat that analysis in 
full here.
35
 Some examples will suffice to make the point that Strasbourg cannot 
convincingly be said to regard private bodies performing public functions as governmental 
organisations. 
 
In liberal theory, as seen above, private bodies and individuals can usually be distinguished 
from public or ‘state’ bodies by their motives. Whereas public bodies must serve the public 
interest, private bodies can act for their own ends within the confines of the law. This basic 
distinction may be termed the ‘selflessness’ principle – the lawful selfishness of private 
bodies contrasts with the necessary ‘selflessness’ of public ones. To infer with any 
confidence that Strasbourg regards private bodies performing public functions as 
governmental organisations, one would need to see a clear example in the case law of a self-
serving private organisation such as a profit-making company being treated by Strasbourg as 
a governmental organisation upon the performance of a particular, public, function. No clear 
examples can be found in the Art 34 context, however. In fact, Strasbourg has recently ruled 
on two occasions that bodies will not be governmental organisations under Art 34 if they 
possess predominantly self-serving commercial motives.
36
 It is true that Strasbourg 
                                                          
34
 Danderyds Kommun v Sweden (52559/99), applied in that respect in the Scottish case of Grampian University 
Hospitals NHS Trust v Napier (2004) JC 117; Hautaniemi v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR CD 155; Novoseletskiy v 
Ukraine (2006) 43 EHRR 53 at [82]. 
35
 For fuller discussion see Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities’, 145-154. 
36
 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (2008) 47 EHRR 24 at [73]; Ukraine-Tyumen v Ukraine 
(22603/02) at [27].  
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sometimes uses the term ‘public functions’ to describe the activities of bodies whom it 
regards to be governmental organisations under Art 34. For example, in Consejo General de 
Colegios Oficiales de Economistas de España v Spain,
37
 the Commission ruled that the 
General Council of Official Economists’ Associations (GCOEA), a professional regulatory 
body, was a governmental organisation under Art 34 because it was a ‘national authority 
exercising public functions’. But despite the linguistic similarity of this remark with the term 
‘functions of a public nature’ under s 6(3)(b), domestic lawyers should not assume that the 
GCOEA was what the HRA would regard as a hybrid public authority. It is by no means 
clear that the GCOEA, which was created by law to regulate a particular profession, was an 
institutionally private person entitled to further its own interests, like a profit-making 
company, over those of the public. Curiously, the Commission also remarked in Consejo 
General that the GCOEA, as a governmental organisation, could never file an application in 
Strasbourg. If Strasbourg really does believe that private bodies become governmental 
organisations when performing public functions, the Commission is suggesting that these 
bodies are unable to file applications under Art 34 even in respect of their private functions.
38
 
It is difficult to see why this should be, and no explanation was proffered in Consejo General 
itself. It is far more natural to infer from Consejo General that the Commission regarded the 
GCOEA as a governmental organisation not because it was a private body performing public 
functions but, instead, because it was a selfless governmental organisation – what the HRA 
would regard as a core public authority – created and controlled to serve the public interest. 
                                                          
37
 (1995) DR 82-B. 
38
 Quane, ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence’, 117. Rather than concluding that the governmental organisation 
jurisprudence fails to extend to private bodies performing governmental functions, Quane concludes that 
Strasbourg’s ‘hybrid’ governmental organisation concept is unduly harsh on hybrids and urges Strasbourg to 
reconsider its remarks in Consejo General. In response, see Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public 
Authorities’, 154. 
 12 
 
Like the Art 34 jurisprudence, the state responsibility jurisprudence can be easily misread. In 
Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom,
39
 for example, a schoolboy received corporal 
punishment from the headmaster of his private school and sought to claim a breach of Arts 3 
and 8 in Strasbourg. The issue therefore arose as to whether the state could be responsible for 
the actions of the private school. Despite ruling that there had been no Convention breach on 
the facts, the Strasbourg court agreed with the applicant that the school engaged the state’s 
responsibility. To support its conclusion, the court made three points.
40
 First, states are 
required by Art 2 of the First Protocol ‘to secure to children their right to education’ and 
disciplinary functions are not ‘merely ancillary to the educational process’. Second, 
independent schools ‘co-exist with a system of public education’ in the United Kingdom. 
Third, ‘the State cannot absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to 
private bodies or individuals.’ It is by no means clear from these rather cryptic remarks, in 
reply to one academic writer,
41
 that the private school engaged the state’s responsibility as a 
governmental organisation, especially given that the court began its analysis of the state 
responsibility issue by emphasising that the Convention can place states under positive 
obligations to regulate the behaviour of private bodies in specific situations.
42
 
 
                                                          
39
 (1995) 19 EHRR 112. 
40
 Ibid., at [27]-[28]. 
41
 Quane evidently interprets Strasbourg’s ruling in Costello-Roberts as a governmental organisation ruling 
because she believes the ruling to be instructive in determining the meaning of ‘functions of a public nature’ 
under s 6(3)(b), having earlier argued that Strasbourg’s positive obligation jurisprudence can never be relevant 
to the domestic courts' treatment of that provision: see Quane, ‘The Strasbourg jurisprudence’, 108 and 110. In 
response to the view that the positive obligation jurisprudence can never be relevant to interpreting s 6(3)(b), 
see Williams, ‘A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities’, 147-148. 
42
 Ibid., at [26]. The Strasbourg court in Storck v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 6 and Lord Mance in YL, n 11 
above, at [95], also saw Costello-Roberts as a positive obligations case. 
 13 
It cannot be reliably inferred from either the Art 34 or state responsibility strands of 
jurisprudence that Strasbourg regards private bodies as governmental organisations when 
they perform public functions. The better view is that private bodies remain non-
governmental organisations through and through. Most obviously this conclusion exposes the 
irrelevance of the governmental organisation jurisprudence to the meaning of the term 
‘functions of a public nature’ under s 6(3)(b).43 More importantly for present purposes 
however, the conclusion that private bodies remain non-governmental organisations when 
performing public functions debunks the rights-stripping idea. Hybrids enjoy Convention 
rights under the HRA, even when performing public functions. 
 
B. The chameleonic model 
 
Acknowledging that hybrid public authorities enjoy Convention rights in their public 
capacities is one thing; protecting their Convention rights is another. For the most part the 
courts should not find this a difficult task. All they need to do is recognise that the 
performance by a hybrid of public functions has no bearing on its ability to make Convention 
claims in court. So, for example, if a local authority applies to revoke a private care home’s 
operating licence without adequate notice of the proceedings with the result that the 
operator’s business is destroyed, the operator should be able to allege under the HRA that the 
local authority has breached its rights under Art 1 of the First Protocol and Art 6.
44
 The fact 
that the operator’s business may consist of delivering contracted out residential care services, 
                                                          
43
 This serves as a rebuttal, therefore, to the views of the judges and academics at n 32 above. 
44
 These were the facts of Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853, but the 
claimants were unable to make the Convention argument because the facts arose before the HRA entered into 
force. 
 14 
and that in the light of s 145 HSCA the operator is performing public functions under s 
6(3)(b) HRA when doing so, will be irrelevant to its ability to make that claim. The same 
would also be true if the hybrid sought to rely defensively on its Convention rights against a 
public authority by way of collateral challenge,
45
 or if the hybrid sought to use the common 
law horizontal effect mechanism to advance its Convention rights against a private defendant. 
All the courts need to do is allow the hybrid to advance those claims notwithstanding that it 
might be doing so during the discharge of its public functions. 
 
In one respect the situation is more problematic however, which is why the hybrid scheme 
should be read as generating chameleonic horizontal effect. On its face, by labelling private 
bodies performing public functions as public authorities, the hybrid scheme intends to treat 
hybrids in the same manner as core public authorities such as local authorities or government 
ministers in court. If a claimant brings an Art 8 claim against a local authority, for example, 
courts assessing the merits of that claim will work through the standard analytical formula of 
deciding whether there has been an interference by the local authority with the claimant’s 
prima facie right and, if so, whether that interference is prescribed by law and has a 
legitimate aim according to Art 8(2). At this stage the local authority can rely on applicable 
Convention qualifications by claiming that it interfered with the claimant’s right for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or for the prevention of disorder or crime, and 
so on. But complications arise if hybrids are treated in the same way as core public 
authorities and the court works through the same analytical process with a hybrid defendant 
performing public functions. Whilst hybrids might be able to avail themselves of certain 
                                                          
45
 Section 7(1)(b) HRA allows the victim to rely on their Convention rights in proceedings which are already 
underway. 
 15 
Convention qualifications in isolated situations – private prison operators could claim that 
they were acting for the prevention of disorder or crime by routinely intercepting prisoners’ 
communications, for example
46
 – they will generally find it hard to do so. As Stanley 
Burnton J observed at first instance in Leonard Cheshire, ‘the justifications referred to in 
Article 8.2 [ECHR] are all matters relevant to government, and not of any non-public body’ 
such as a care home operator.
47
 It is difficult to see how a private care home operator could 
claim that it was acting in the ‘economic well-being of the country’, for instance, when 
attempting to serve notice on residents to quit as in Leonard Cheshire and YL. Most 
importantly, it is difficult to see how it – or any other hybrid – could claim to be acting for 
the protection of the rights of others when seeking to advance its own right, say, to respect 
for property under Art 1 of the First Protocol. If insufficient account is taken of the private 
nature of the hybrid defendant and hence the necessarily horizontal nature of the dispute, the 
risk arises that hybrids are unable to deploy their own Convention rights defensively against 
private claimants through the ‘rights of others’ qualification. This is problematic because the 
HRA, through the Strasbourg scheme, requires hybrids to be able to rely on the Convention 
regardless of whether they perform public functions at the time. 
 
Contrast the position of hybrid defendants under a purely ‘vertical’ reading of the hybrid 
scheme with that of ordinary private defendants in the parallel common law horizontal effect 
context. In the common law context, private defendants can deploy their own Convention 
rights through the Convention qualifications if a claimant seeks to use the Convention against 
                                                          
46
 C. Donnelly, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties: A Comparative Perspective (OUP, 
Oxford, 2007), p. 261. 
47
 Leonard Cheshire, n 18 above, at [71]. See also Oliver, ‘Functions of a public nature’, 343-344; R. Buxton, 
‘Private life and the English judges’ (2009) OJLS 413, p. 416. 
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them. This is because Convention rights are deployed by a claimant indirectly in the common 
law context, i.e. against the court, whose duty as a public authority requires it to develop 
existing causes of action in a Convention-friendly fashion in order to safeguard the 
claimant’s rights.48 If the defendant feels that developing the common law in this way would 
infringe its own rights, it can plead those rights as a defence to the claimant’s claim because 
the court, as a public authority, can claim that it is acting for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of ‘others’ (i.e. the defendant’s Convention rights) by doing so.49 The court then 
balances the competing rights to see which should prevail. 
 
So if the claimant deploys his or her Convention rights indirectly, against the court, the 
defendant has no difficulty asserting its own Convention rights in response. To avoid the risk 
of rights-stripping hybrids by failing to attach sufficient weight to the horizontal nature of the 
hybrid scheme, the hybrid scheme should be interpreted in the same way. This is the 
‘chameleonic’ reading of the hybrid scheme. Although the scheme creates an ostensibly 
vertical framework of rights protection against a private body by designating it a public 
authority, the framework switches to take on a more horizontal character when the dispute 
gets underway. When in court, the claimant should be taken, as in the common law context, 
to assert their rights through the court rather than directly against the hybrid defendant itself. 
 
C. Why the model works 
 
                                                          
48
 See chapter XXX. 
49
 Because unqualified Convention rights cannot be balanced against the rights of others, the defendant could 
only advance their Convention rights if the claimant relied on a qualified right against them. 
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Not only does the chameleonic model fully guarantee the ability of hybrid public authorities 
to rely on the Convention; it also exposes the hybrid scheme as giving rise to a form of 
horizontal effect similar to that which seems to operate in the parallel common law context. 
 
The hybrid scheme, properly understood, contains elements of vertical and horizontal effect. 
It is vertical in the sense that it generates a statutory cause of action against an ostensibly 
public body. It is directly horizontal in the sense that the defendant hybrid public authority is 
in reality a private individual. In substance, the scheme also resembles one of indirect 
horizontal effect. Not perfectly so, because an indirectly horizontal scheme applies 
Convention rights to the law rather than generating a cause of action directly against the 
defendant itself, as the hybrid scheme does.
50
 But common law indirect horizontal effect 
bears an additional defining characteristic, which is shared by the hybrid scheme once the 
dispute reaches court – that the claimant asserts their rights through the court, which sits at 
the apex of the dispute and balances the competing rights of the claimant and defendant. The 
switch that occurs in the rights protection framework under the chameleonic model therefore 
represents a shift from an ostensibly vertical framework to a framework roughly describable 
as indirectly horizontal in nature. 
 
The hybrid scheme, as a scheme of horizontal effect broadly conceived, is not unlike the 
scheme of horizontal effect that the courts apply in the common law. This, too, is one of 
indirect horizontal effect. The courts do not appear to regard themselves as bound to create 
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brand new Convention-based causes of action.
51
 Their view, instead, is that they must 
develop existing causes of action in a Convention-friendly fashion. Little evidence suggests 
that the courts subscribe to the ‘weak’ model of indirect horizontal effect which requires 
them simply to consider and balance the values contained in the Convention against existing 
common law factors.
52
 Rather, judges seem to regard themselves as bound to develop those 
causes of action consistently with Convention rights. In other words, they apply those 
Convention rights,
53
 which supplant the existing law with Convention norms,
54
 between the 
claimant and defendant to the dispute.
55
 In A v B plc for instance, Lord Woolf CJ stated in the 
breach of confidence context that the court’s duty under s 6 should be discharged by 
‘absorbing the rights which articles 8 and 10 protect into the [existing cause of action]… so 
that it accommodates the requirements of those articles.’56 Further support for this view can 
be found in more recent cases. Thus, Buxton LJ stated in McKennitt v Ash that ‘in order to 
find the rules of the English law of breach of confidence we now have to look in the 
jurisprudence of articles 8 and 10.’57 Echoing the remarks of Lord Woolf CJ in A v B, his 
Lordship then described those articles as ‘not merely of persuasive or parallel effect but… 
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the very content of the domestic tort that the English court has to enforce.’58 Similarly, Eady 
J stated in Mosley v News Group Newspapers that the HRA required the values expressed in 
Arts 8 and 10 to be ‘acknowledged and enforced by the courts.’59 
 
In the common law as well as the hybrid context, then, the court applies the Convention 
rights between the parties and balances competing rights, if necessary, to determine which 
should prevail. This is significant. In both the common law and hybrid contexts, Parliament 
has been unclear about when it expects Convention rights to apply between individuals. 
There are various linguistically plausible interpretations of the term ‘functions of a public 
nature’ under s 6(3)(b) and, as seen above, various linguistically plausible interpretations of 
the scope and effect of the court’s duty to give develop the common law in a Convention-
friendly fashion. Judges are likely in both contexts to be resolving the issues with at least 
some reference to their own ‘feel’ for how far Convention rights should be permitted to 
infuse the private sphere. If the judges are prepared to endorse something akin to the strong 
indirect horizontal effect model in the common law context, they should not be too unhappy 
with the chameleonic reading – which is substantially similar – of the hybrid public authority 
scheme. 
 
This is not to suggest that the chameleonic model is identical in nature and scope to the 
model adopted by the courts in the common law context, however. First, it is clear that the 
remedial provisions differ under each scheme. The court’s remedial powers are governed by 
s 8 HRA under the hybrid scheme whereas the court awards remedies according to its own 
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domestic precedents in the common law context.
60
 Second, the scope of each scheme, i.e. 
when a claimant can assert their Convention rights against the defendant, also differs. Under 
the common law scheme, the claimant cannot assert their Convention rights against the 
defendant unless he or she can convince the court that the state would be liable in Strasbourg 
if his or her Convention rights were left unprotected in the circumstances in question – if the 
state would not be liable in Strasbourg, the claimant’s rights are already protected and the 
court will not be acting unlawfully by refusing to develop the common law.
61
 Claimants in 
the hybrid context need not demonstrate that the state would be liable in Strasbourg, 
however, because by necessary implication the hybrid scheme generates Convention 
remedies in domestic law which expand on those available against the state. This is because a 
particular body can only engage the state’s responsibility in one of two ways in Strasbourg,62 
and Parliament has provided for domestic remedies in each situation using other schemes of 
liability under the HRA. If the claimant’s rights are interfered with by what Strasbourg would 
regard as an emanation of the state, the claimant can pursue a direct claim against that body 
as a core public authority under s 6 HRA.
63
 If the behaviour emanates instead from a private 
person whose behaviour the state is under a positive obligation to regulate, the claimant can 
pursue a remedy through the common law horizontal effect mechanism, as seen above. 
Provided that the subject matter of the claimant’s complaint falls within the scope of an 
applicable Convention right, in the hybrid context it is not necessary for the claimant to show 
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that the state itself would be liable in Strasbourg if he or she were left without a remedy in 
domestic law. 
 
Domestic courts have considerable room to expand their definition of a public function 
before the hybrid scheme can be said to overburden private defendants. It should be 
remembered that claimants can only assert their Convention rights against private defendants 
who perform public functions under the hybrid scheme. Even on a broader construction of s 
6(3)(b) which included the delivery of contracted out public services, the vast majority of 
activities undertaken by private bodies would still fall outwith the definition of a public 
function with the result that private defendants would be largely shielded from liability under 
the hybrid scheme. This contrasts with the relatively claimant-friendly position in the 
common law horizontal effect context – all the claimant needs to do here is present a cause of 
action which is ‘relevant’ to the nature of the Convention claim made.64 The extent to which 
the courts have been prepared to stretch the breach of confidence action to ensure 
compatibility with Art 8 demonstrates the relative ease with which claimants can assert their 
rights in the common law context.
65
 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
Whilst it previously appears to have gone unrecognised, hybrid public authorities do in fact 
enjoy Convention rights of their own under the HRA during the performance of public 
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functions. The prevailing academic and judicial assumption that a hybrid is somehow 
‘stripped’ of Convention rights in its public capacity is a myth. Not only does this confirm 
that hybrids can use their Convention rights to mount challenges against other public 
authorities when acting publicly; it also opens up a valuable line of defence to hybrids who 
find themselves on the receiving end of Convention claims in court. In order to ensure that 
hybrids can make use of this defence, however, the hybrid scheme should be read as 
generating chameleonic horizontal effect. 
 
Properly understood in this way and juxtaposed against the courts’ treatment of the 
horizontality issue in the parallel common law context, the hybrid scheme is far riper for 
expansion in scope than the judges appear to believe. The courts’ own case law in the 
common law context indicates that they should not regard expanding s 6(3)(b) to include 
contracted out public services as causing undue harm to hybrid defendants. The width of the 
term ‘functions of a public nature’ under s 6(3)(b) is not the only factor responsible for 
determining the defendant’s liability in court. Even if a claimant succeeds in demonstrating 
that a private defendant performs public functions, the claimant must then show, if the hybrid 
asserts its own Convention right in response, that the claimant’s Convention right should 
prevail. It is at this stage that the court will be able to conduct an intricate and context-
sensitive balancing exercise between the competing rights.
66
 This is the forum in which 
judges should air and accord due weight to any concerns that they might harbour about the 
impact on the defendant if the claimant’s claim is upheld. Foreclosing the issue at the 
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threshold stage by construing the meaning of a public function unduly narrowly is not the 
answer. 
